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Chapter One: Introduction 
Elections are the cornerstone of democracy in that they help to cultivate legitimacy, act as 
an accountability mechanism, and allow constituents to communicate with elected officials. 
However, if an election is not seen as fair it seriously threatens all of those key features. It has 
caused many people in the past two decades to question how fair US elections are.  One criticism 
is the effectiveness of the Electoral College. This occurred following the 2001 election that 
culminated in the case of Bush v. Gore and once again with the 2016 election of Donald Trump 
where he lost the popular vote. The Electoral College is seen as problematic but one systemic 
issue that has recently been garnering more attention is the lead up to the election with how 
electoral districts are drawn.  
An article that sought to measure 54 countries’ level of gerrymandering, found that “the 
United States and Malaysia, using majoritarian electoral system, are, by far, the countries with 
the least impartial district boundaries” (Coma and Lago, 2016, p. 100). The focus of the article 
was analyzing the neutrality of a country's electoral boundaries. If the electoral districts of a 
country are not impartial it is possible that they were gerrymandered, manipulating boundaries 
with the intent of creating a desired result that typically favors a political party or a certain class 
of people. The article does not detail how these boundaries are created but there are many factors 
that can contribute to a map seeming impartial such as a politically motivated party drawing 
lines, unclear map criteria, or even the political geography of a specific region. Regardless, it can 
be harmful as it can weaken a minority population’s vote, altering potential outcomes, or 
ensuring the reelection of incumbents.  
2017, however, can be seen as a potential turning point for electoral maps in the United 
States with the Supreme Court case Gill v. Whitford. In 2016, the United States District Court 
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ruled in Whitford v. Gill that the map in Wisconsin “constitutes an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander” (2016, 843). The plaintiffs assert that it ”treats voters unequally, diluting their 
voting power based on their political beliefs, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantee of equal protection," and "unreasonably burdens their First Amendment rights of 
association and free speech" (Whitford v. Gill, 2016, 855). There are many questions raised in the 
case, but the one I argue should be focused on is if judicially manageable standards exist for the 
Supreme Court to evaluate this case under, and which standards will be the most effective.  
       The Supreme Court has tried gerrymandering cases in the past, but most of those have 
addressed racial rather than partisan gerrymandering1. Partisan gerrymandering can be harder to 
show because of a multitude of reasons. One of those is that racial gerrymandering is held to the 
highest level of scrutiny (Shaw v. Reno, 1993, 643). Though an argument may be made that 
voting is a fundamental right, people in biased districts are not being prevented from voting. 
Additionally, party affiliation is not an immutable characteristic and in “swing states” it may be 
possible for results to shift each year.  
 Gill v. Whitford’s importance lies in the fact that it asks several questions of the court. 
One of those is how to determine if bias exists. It is one thing to say that elections appear biased 
or unfairly advantage one side. It is another to have a way to support that argument with facts to 
show possible outcomes. My research will look at what is the most effective way to determine of 
there is bias present in a map. To do this I will first focus on the history of partisan 
gerrymandering cases and the Supreme Court. Next, I will lay out my evaluative framework for 
assessing different methods. Then I will review each of these in turn before coming to my final 
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conclusion. There I will show that judicially manageable standards exist and advocate for the 
most appropriate methods to be used.  
Baker v. Carr 
  Baker v. Carr is the case that is precedent for modern redistricting law today. Decided in 
1962, it was the case that allowed the courts to consider legislative apportionment on the merits. 
This case challenged the constitutionality of a Tennessee apportionment law that was created in 
1901. The appellants in this case were voters and they argued that the state was “arbitrarily and 
capriciously apportioning the seats in the General Assembly” because the population had shifted 
so dramatically from when the law was passed to the time of the court case (Baker v. Carr, 1962, 
192). It is important to note that the Supreme Court did not decide on the issue of Tennessee 
using the 1901 law, but rather they decided whether the issue had standing.  
 Why this case is seen as a landmark is not at all what it says about legislative 
apportionment, but rather what it says about political question doctrine. The court addresses two 
main points in this case: first is subject matter jurisdiction and the second is justiciability. On the 
former point the court finds simply that a federal court has subject matter jurisdiction because the 
appellants are challenging the constitutionality of a law and the district courts are allowed to rule 
on these issues (Baker v. Carr, 1962, 199-200). Additionally, they do touch on relevant 
precedent where the court has decided on redistricting cases in the past. The appellees contend 
that the Court has previously decide that they do not have jurisdiction for redistricting cases. 
However, the Court does say that the appellants misinterpreted the cases and there is not 
reasoning to say the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction. 
 The latter point in this case is justiciability. This is the crucial point of the case that 
makes it important today. The appellants in this case claimed that their right to equal protection 
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of the law was violated. However, the District Court and the appellees claimed that in a cases 
involving apportionment it can “involve no federal constitutional right except one resting on the 
guaranty of a republican form of government” (Baker v. Carr, 1962, 209). The Supreme Court 
found this false. Instead they focused on what the political question doctrine was and whether 
this case fit under any category of the questions they cannot hear. There are six categories of 
questions that the court listed out, but this case simply asks the Court to decide whether or not 
the action is discrimination based on an arbitrary action rather than a policy. They found that this 
question is political in nature, but is not a political question (Baker v. Carr, 1962, 227).  
 The implications of this case are fairly widespread. The most immediate application of 
this is that the Supreme Court can hear cases on redistricting, but it also set in place clear 
guidelines for whether a case addressed a political question or not. The purpose it serves in Gill 
v. Whitford is not necessarily the precedent the Court will be relying on in the case, but rather it 
provides us with historical context. Questions of legislative apportionment can be difficult for the 
Court to decide upon—it’s a realm that hasn’t been touched. Given that it took until 1962 to even 
be able to consider these questions justiciable, it is not surprising that it took so long to hear 
questions of partisan redistricting.  
Reynolds v. Sims 
 Tried two years later Reynolds v. Sims established how the court was to deal with 
gerrymandering cases and how people should be represented in the legislature. This case was 
able to be tried after the decision in Baker v. Carr. However, unlike Baker this case set forth an 
actual guideline to be used in redistricting cases. This case dealt with how electoral districts were 
divided in Alabama. The state constitution required at least one representative per county and 
one state Senator. However, there were major differences between the counties in terms of 
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population. Voters from Jefferson County, a county with 41 times as many voters as another 
district, said this kept them from participating in a republican form of government (Reynolds v 
Sims, 1964, 541). 
 The Supreme Court upheld the challenge to the law as they found it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. This is because the clause demanded equal representation in the legislature for 
all citizens and that direct representation was “a bedrock of our political system” (Reynolds v. 
Sims, 1964, 564). Importantly, this case also established the one person one vote doctrine that is 
used in many cases.  
 One thing to note about these cases is that they specifically address the number of 
legislators and how they are apportioned. These cases do not deal with how a map is drawn. 
Reynolds, though, presents the standard that the lower courts as well as the Supreme Court uses 
when deciding if a plan is constitutional or not. This is commonly known as one person, one vote 
that the court tends to prefer.  In many cases this doctrine is the one that is applied whether it 
deals with racial gerrymandering or partisan gerrymandering.  
Davis v. Bandemer 
 Davis v. Bandemer was the first case that looked at claims of political gerrymandering. 
This case happened more than two decades after Baker v. Carr in 1986. It dealt with the 1981 
apportionment of the Indiana General Assembly that was created under a Republican majority. 
The boundaries of the districts, as well as election results, appeared odd to Democrats. There was 
a mix of single and multi-member districts— with no rule followed to determine the difference— 
, little relation between Indiana’s House and Senate, and the translation of votes to seats did not 
seem entirely proportional  (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986, 114-115).  
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 The District Court found the plan unconstitutional, but it was not affirmed in the Supreme 
Court (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986, 113). That is what complicates the precedent for deciding 
partisan gerrymandering cases moving forward. In the case, they did hold that political 
gerrymandering was a justiciable question. Their reasoning had two main parts. First was that the 
Court has “consistently adjudicated equal protection claims in the legislative districting context 
regarding inequalities in population between districts” (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986, 118). This 
goes back to Reynolds v. Sims and looking at the one person, one vote principle (Davis v. 
Bandemer, 1986, 119). Second, the court did say that it would intervene in cases that deals with 
race. If districting is designed to “minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political 
elements of the voting population” then it would also be a constitutional issue for the court to 
address (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986, 179). Essentially, the court does find that questions of 
political gerrymandering are justiciable. They look at the reasoning used in Baker v. Carr and 
find the argument similar in this case. They also revisit Reynolds v. Sims to show that the types 
of claims in Baker were resolved in Reynolds in determining how a court rules on district sizes 
and proportion. They go on to say in this reasoning that they will not rule that claims of equal 
representation are nonjusticiable.  
 Though the court did find the claim justiciable, they did not find the claim to be in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. They do hold that the District Court was right in saying 
that the apportionment plan was discriminatory in nature, but there needs to be proof beyond 
misrepresentation (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986). The plan may be biased, but no plan is perfect and 
elections are political in nature. Especially since the focus was on the state as a whole and not 
one specific district where Democrats were disadvantaged making it much harder to prove. The 
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Court said that it is hard to show that Democrats were excluded rather than they failed to get 
members of that party to show up to the polls.  
 This case complicated matters for determining if partisan gerrymandering exists or is 
harmful in a state. Though, the Court ruled that political gerrymandering is justiciable, it did 
make it harder for those bringing forward a case to show harm. This case does say that the way 
the map was drawn was discriminatory, but it did not have enough of an impact to show that it 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. The tension exists because the Court does give examples of 
how a political gerrymandering claim may be proven, but it provides a barrier moving forward to 
challenging the constitutionality of such claims. The Supreme Court may say that these questions 
of representation are justiciable, but up to now they have not shown that they are willing to 
declare these claims unconstitutional.  
Vieth v. Jubelirer 
 Vieth v. Jubelirer is standing precedent for claims of partisan gerrymandering. The case 
is similar to Davis but it raises questions about Congressional apportionment rather than state 
level apportionment. Following the census in 2000 the Congressional delegation from 
Pennsylvania was reduced by two members, while the Republicans had control; it was alleged 
that they manipulated the map to disadvantage Democrats (Vieth v. Jubelirer, 2004, 272). 
Members of the Democratic party sued because they claimed that it violated the  one-person, 
one-vote principle of Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution, the Equal Protection clause, the 
Privileges and Immunities clause, and freedom of association (Vieth v. Jubelirer, 2004, 272). 
 The case raised more questions than Davis did and was also less successful. The lower 
court found that it only violated the one-person, one-vote principle as the districts were not the 
same size (Vieth v. Jubelirer, 2004, 273). When it reached the Supreme Court it raised additional 
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questions that Davis did not address. This case dealt with members of a party suing as a block, 
something that was called into question at the lower court level. Additionally, it brought to 
question whether a state was in violation of the Constitution if it allowed a districting plan that 
disadvantaged a minority of voters. In this case the minority was members of the Democratic 
party. This case, therefore, made the Court answer questions about political gerrymandering that 
had not been addressed since Davis v. Bandemer.  
 The Court, though, did not answer all these questions. Though, they have the jurisdiction 
to rule they did not intervene because no appropriate judicial remedy could be found (Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 2004, 281). Even the question of jurisdiction, though, was challenged in this case. One 
part of determining if a case constitutes a political question is if there are judicially manageable 
standards present. The Supreme Court in Davis essentially claimed that they could find no 
standards, but that did not mean that ones did not exist. In the years between Bandemer and 
Vieth there were still no standards found for the Court to truly rely on. The standard they had 
used was that the plaintiffs had to show that there was discrimination and that discrimination had 
an effect (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986, 141). In this case Vieth proposed that the standard was 
whether they could prove that voters of a political party were either “packed or cracked” in 
districts and that it was an attempt to keep voters of that party from turning a majority of votes 
into a majority of seats (Vieth v. Jubelirer, 2004, 289). The Court did not want to use this 
standard. They said that it is hard to measure as well as unreliable. In constructing these 
standards it is hard to do because each state has their own standards for fair redistricting and also 
it is hard to draw a line where judicial intervention is always needed.  
 The conclusion that the Court reaches is that there are no judicially manageable 
standards. However, they once again say that just because this case has no judicially manageable 
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standards, it does not mean that they will not determine ones to be used in the future. The only 
guidance that the Court gives is that these cases have traditionally been tried under equal 
protection claims, but that may not be the best way forward. Equal protection focuses on whether 
a identifying a class of people—specifically race in the context of redistricting—has been used in 
a discriminatory manner, not what their political affiliation is (Vieth v. Jubelirer, 2004, 293). 
 Veith is the current standard which is to say there is not a standard. The court has still not 
spoke on this issue since it decided Veith. However, it is clear that this case has had a lasting 
impact since it was decided. Claims to political gerrymandering have only continued to emerge 
without the courts truly having any way to intervene. A decision in the future is crucial to either 
say what the standards are or declare if this question is even justiciable.  
League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry  
 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry case was a challenge to the 2003 
Texas redistricting plan. It was mid-decade replacing the plan that was instituted following the 
2000 census; it is important to note the the plan instituted by Democrats in 1991 was largely 
considered to be a biased plan that disadvantaged Republicans (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 410). 
Another relevant fact is that in 2000 the districting was created by a federal judge as Texas did 
not present a plan that was compliant with constitutional standards (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 415). 
This case ruled in favor of LULAC, finding it in violation of the Voting Rights Act.  
 For the opinion, Justice Kennedy rejected the appellant’s test that mid-decade plans 
should always be struck down if it is done with partisan motives (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 417). 
He said that though the motives of the legislature were clear, “partisan motives did not dictate 
the plan in its entirety” (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 417). Essentially, the Justices found it 
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dangerous to make a clear cut rule for a districting plan without taking the full map into 
consideration.  
 Another claim by appellants was that in Texas District 23 the voting power of Latinos 
was negatively impacted (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 427). The court found that in that district it 
unfairly disadvantaged Latinos as it was designed to protect an incumbent candidate and in doing 
that lessened the votes of a politically active community; this was not sustained (LULAC v. 
Perry, 442).  
 One reason LULAC v. Perry has importance in redistricting literature today is that the 
Justices engaged in an analysis of certain methods. Justice Kennedy said that, “I would conclude 
asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship” (LULAC v. Perry, 
2006, 420). However, Justice Stevens in his dissent agrees with using a partisan symmetry 
standard as it was not only submitted in a brief, but also used in expert testimony (LULAC v. 
Perry, 2006, 467). Justice Ginsburg in her dissent also disagrees with Justice Kennedy’s rejection 
of standards such as the sole purpose standard as well as the partisan symmetry standard, 
indicating that certain members of the court may be open to creating a judicially manageable 
standard for partisan gerrymandering (LULAC v. Perry, 2006, 492).   
Social Science and the Courts 
 Gill v. Whitford’s decision will have an impact on American politics moving forward. 
The importance in this case is not only because it will determine how political gerrymandering is 
handled, but also because it will show how the Supreme Court will create judicial standards 
moving forward. This is because there has been a lack of true guidance for gerrymandering.  
 The question in this case is largely how the Court will create standards and what evidence 
it will rely on. This is not the first case where amicus curiae briefs have been submitted and it 
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will not be the last. To see how the Court handles using—or not using—social science to create 
standards will have an impact on many cases. The fact of the matter remains that relying on 
social science techniques may be the only way that Gill v. Whitford could create judicially 
manageable standards. The only reason to infer this is that the Supreme Court has not yet created 
them absent of using any research. They continuously say that there is not a way yet to create a 
set of standards.  
 Before evaluating how the Supreme Court could potentially construct standards, it is 
important to look at how they treat social science in regards to creating standards. One turning 
point that scholars recognize for social science is in the decision of Brown v. Board of Education, 
they even contend that the wake of Brown brought forward the Law and Society movement 
(Moran, 2010, p. 516). This is because the Court included a footnote that referenced the social 
science research brought forward by the plaintiffs (Moran, 2010, p. 518). Though Brown 
indicated that the Court may be more open to social science, they were still wary of relying on it 
and are to this day. The main tension is whether social science can be objective like law because 
many Justices fear the bias that it will bring (Moran, 2010). The other issue is the fact that 
Supreme Court is supposed to rely on constitutional precedent and the question then becomes 
does social science have the ability to help answer questions raised about facts of the case to 
guide the justices on applying precedent (Moran, 2010).  
 While there has been struggle in using social science evidence we can look to past cases 
to see how exactly the court approaches the evidence. One example is seen in McCleskey v. 
Kemp. This case, like Brown, deals with evidence of racial discrimination. However, this case is 
in regards to the death penalty and its application. This case revolves around an appeal claiming 
that the death penalty is in violation of the 8th and 14th amendment as its application is 
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“administered in a racially discriminatory manner” (McCleskey v. Kemp, 1987, 279). The main 
issue that the Court found in this case is that though the study discussed discrimination as a 
whole it did not show that the individual application in McCleskey’s case was discriminatory. 
Moving forward it is clear that there needs to be a close relationship between the social science 
evidence that is presented and the actual case at hand. Due to the adversarial nature of our system 
that is natural to expect as the law does uphold the same principles as in science.   
 Another important case to examine is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 
This case served as a framework of criteria for how the Court would approach the testimony of 
expert witnesses. This case involved the parents of children born with birth defects saying that 
medication the mothers took when they were pregnant caused it. At the trial court level most of 
the case revolved around proving whether or not the medicine was actually the cause of birth 
defects. There was tension between looking at the Frye test, which is a common law standard for 
scientific evidence, and the federal evidence laws. The court set four standards that expert 
witnesses need to meet but it is the trial court’s responsibility to ensure this (Daubert v Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 1993). The first is that the evidence is reliable in that it has been 
tested and can be tested, it is not subjective material; second, is whether the theory at hand has 
been published or subject to peer review.; third, is the margin of error in the research; and fourth, 
is whether it is generally accepted in the scientific community (Daubert v Merrell 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1993, 592-595). An important point made by Justice Blackmun made in 
this was that judges have a “gatekeeping role” and that the difference between law and science is 
that science is “subject to perpetual revision” where law has to “resolve disputes finally and 
quickly” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 1993, 597).  
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 In the decision with Gill v. Whitford,  the justices will have to reconcile some of the 
tension with social science, exclude its usage for developing standards, or say that judicially 
manageable standards do not exist. The problem is that there are multiple ways that political 
scientists have used to determine if there is any partisan bias in redistricting.  
As I argue for the development of standards, I will be under the assumption that partisan 
bias exists in some form in order to look at how it can be evaluated. First, I will create an 
evaluative structure in order to objectively analyze each method. Each method will be discussed 
before I come to my final conclusion about what method the Justices should use to create a 
judicially manageable standard.  
 
Chapter Two: Evaluative Structure 
 The center of the debate in Gill v. Whitford is whether judicially manageable standards 
can be created in order to rule on the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering. For the last 
thirty years the Court has upheld the justiciability of cases dealing with redistricting and 
legislative apportionment, but this has been done without creating any real standards. In Vieth v. 
Jubelirer the justices stated their concerns that there was a “no judicially discernible and 
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have emerged” which 
would bring challenges of partisan gerrymandering to a territory that would make it non-
justiciable by the court (Vieth v. Jubelirer, 2004, 281). I will argue, though, that there are 
standards available and evaluate them.  
 The Supreme Court had set standards with Davis v. Bandemer. In that cases the justices 
focused on two factors: “plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against 
an identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group” (Davis v. 
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Bandemer, 1986, 127). In their decision, the Court said that it wasn’t enough to prove a “lack of 
proportional representation” when bringing a case of gerrymandering forward. There needed to 
be proof that the map would “constantly degrade a voter’s influence… over the political process 
as a whole” (Davis v. Bandemer, 1986, 110). The problem with Davis, however, is that it was a 
plurality opinion that did not establish a precedent.  
 Eighteen years later in Vieth v. Jubelirer the court confronted partisan gerrymandering 
again in a plurality opinion. Justice Scalia wrote that he found that there was a lack of judicially 
manageable standards thereby rendering partisan claims of gerrymandering nonjusticiable. In 
doing this he did evaluate the standards that were set forth in Davis. While the first part of the 
test would stand for him, as it would be easy to satisfy, he finds issue with the latter half of the 
test. Scalia agrees with Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Davis v. Bandemer that said the 
standard "will over time either prove unmanageable and arbitrary or else evolve towards some 
loose form of proportionality” (1986, 155).  This is where the issue in Vieth was found. The 
court could not reach a majority, found issue with the current standards, and wanted to overturn 
the precedent. In my own evaluation I will consider the historical precedent as well as looking at 
the amicus briefs for the standards that experts in the field of redistricting consider a prudent way 
to evaluate these tests.  
 To evaluate the different methods,  I will use a three prong approach. Each prong will be 
a requirement that the test should meet. These prongs were decided due to the opinions of the 
Supreme Court and also by looking at how the federal courts decided these cases as well. 
Though this will not give a guarantee that this will be how the court will decide Gill v. Whitford 
it does allow us to have a discussion around how the Supreme Court has historically developed 
standards and how they evolve over time. Partisan gerrymandering cases are ones where the 
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court is more likely to use social science as a standard due to their inability to develop one on 
purely legal grounds.  
 The first standard is if the test can determine partisan bias is present in district lines. This 
standard is not looking at the intent of the lines, but if the lines themselves are drawn  in a way 
that could potentially disadvantage a group based on their partisanship. This is the most basic 
function it must serve and also an important one. In order to conform to legal standards a district 
map may seem odd if it does not meet certain criteria such as compactness, equal population 
size, and respecting existing political or geographical boundaries. Additionally, a map may look 
questionable, but in reality was designed in order to adhere to the specific criteria.  
The second standard is that it needs to be able to show the extent of the bias that was 
present in a specific district or state. If a map is found to favor a particular group over another 
one, is it able to measure the effect that it had? There is a difference between a map that may 
boost an incumbent’s chance of winning in one district and a map to purposely keep Democrats 
from winning a majority of seats. This, however, is different from the intent prong from Davis v. 
Bandemer. I am not concerned whether the model is able to show that voters were severely 
disadvantaged. Instead, the method must be able to give some explanation to how the map 
operated in that district and what effect it had.  
The third prong of the test is intent. If a map disadvantages a group with a measurable 
effect, is that intentional or not? This is perhaps one of the most important prongs. It goes further 
than showing a map is potentially discriminatory. A map could seem to be potentially 
discriminatory while still falling within the normal parameters of redistricting as mentioned 
above. The test should be able to indicate some sort of intent behind the map. Now this could be 
that there was no intent and due to population distributions it created a map that appeared biased. 
16 
 
It could also be that there were other, better maps that the redistricting authority knew about or 
the fact that the particular map does not even adhere to the legal standards set forth by the state.  
 The fourth test will be an evaluation of the quality of the method itself. There will be 
some evaluations that come from the Daubert test. It will mostly be looking at where this 
particular method has come from, if there has been peer review, or if it has been mentioned in 
other cases. This is one that will have less bearing in my final judgement, but it is important that 
a specific method can stand up in court.  
 An important note in the structure is that when I draw my conclusions about judicially 
manageable standards, the method that I see as being the most effective may not have passed all 
four prongs. These methods may very well be used in conjunction with one another. This is 
mainly because not all methods are firmly grounded in statistics or equations. Rather some 
methods can serve an important function in helping to understand intent or provide some context 
to statistical results.  
 
Chapter Three: The Methods 
 Gill v. Whitford has had dozens of amicus curiae briefs submitted for both sides. The 
methods I chose were based off of these briefs. Each one selected laid out standards that the 
Supreme Court could potentially apply. For this section I did not use the amicus briefs that 
referenced the justiciability of the question, but instead focused on standards that could be used 



















Yes, it is an 
equation with the 
purpose of 
identifying the 
difference in the 
vote to seat ratio 
for each party in 
the election. 
Yes, it is an 
equation with 
the purpose of 
determining 
“wasted” votes 
in the election 
for each party.  
No. It is usually 
used after a map is 
suspected to be 
biased.  
No. It is usually 
used after a map 
is suspected to 
be biased. 
No.  
2. Does it explain 
the extent of the 
bias? 
Yes, the equation 
provides a 
percentage that can 
be used to see how 
a particular party 





can be used to 
see how a 
particular party 
was effected.  
Yes, it is a 
comparison of 
maps against each 
other placed on a 
curve. An 
evaluation can be 
made of how more 
or less biased a 
map is based on its 
position on the 
curve.  
Yes, it is a 
comparison of 
maps against 
each other. An 
evaluation is 
made looking at 
the map decided 







3. Does it help to 
understand whether 
the bias was 
intentional? 
No.  No.  No.  No.  Yes, this method looks into 
why the redistricting 
authority chose the map. It is 
done through evaluating 
statements, and adherence to 
legal standards. 
4. Could this 
method stand up in 
court? 
Unknown. It was 
proposed in 
LULAC v. Perry. 
Some Justices 
were opposed to it.  
It is peer reviewed 
and seen as 
reliable.  
Unknown. It is a 
newer method 
and a version of 
Partisan 
Symmetry. 





more commonly in 
other disciplines 
not widely used in 
redistricting.  
Unknown. It has 
been applied 




Unknown, likely yes. This is 
a method that is similar to 
traditional court procedures as 
it is evaluating intent.  
Table 1: Summary of the methods using the four prongs of the test. 
Partisan Symmetry 
 Two amicus briefs submitted—one in support of the appellee and one in support of 
neither party—argue that the Court should apply the method of partisan symmetry to determine 
if there was a partisan gerrymander present. One brief submitted by Bernard Grofman and 
Ronald Gaddie suggested using the partisan asymmetry standard as part of a three prong test, 
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which I will address later. The other brief was submitted by a group of political scientists that 
identified partisan asymmetry as a workable standard.  
 Partisan asymmetry is a standard that the court has reviewed before. In League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry this idea was brought to the Court not only in an amicus brief, 
but also as a part of expert testimony (Grofman and King, 2007, 7). The appeal of the standard of 
partisan symmetry lies in the fact that it is simple and requires little mathematics. For a district to 
be symmetrical, the standard “requires that the number of seats one party would receive if it 
garnered a particular percentage of the vote be identical to the number of seats the other party 
would receive if it had received the same percentage of the vote” (Grofman and King, 2007, 8). 
This test shows how many votes needed for a party to gain a seat in a district and looks at the 
differences between them.  
 First we must look at whether this standard identifies potential bias in a district. This is 
the key purpose of the Partisan Symmetry standard. In essence, it allows a judgement to be made 
about the advantage or disadvantage that a party has in getting their representative elected.  
To meet the second standard the method should be able to identify the extent of bias if 
the map was found to be compromised. One key factor that the test for partisan symmetry aims 
to accomplish is the responsiveness of a district. Responsiveness is a result of our winner-take-all 
electoral system, because legislators win a seat with a plurality of a vote, there is a “bonus” given 
to parties that reach a majority in the state thus causing the vote-seat ratio to seem unproportional 
(Grofman and King, 2007, 8). In an electoral system that is truly proportional there will be a one 
to one ratio of vote to seat percentage increase, but it is common for plurality based systems to 
have varying ratios, but it “does not violate symmetry, so long as whatever party wins a majority 
of the votes gets the bonus” (Grofman and King, 2007, 9). Data for the responsiveness of the 
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district can be used to then determine the degree of partisan bias. This does satisfy the first 
criterion as well as the second. The test for partisan symmetry does help to explain the extent to 
which bias exists in a map.  It does that and with new statistical modeling of the “seats-votes 
curve” it help to understand the degree of partisan bias as well (Grofman and King, 2007, 10). 
This measure looks at how the statewide average vote in districts translates into the statewide 
percentage of seats (Grofman and King, 2007, 10). This statistical set is important because it 
does identify both the responsiveness of the electoral system while showing the degree of bias as 
the curve can be followed to look at what percentage of votes a party would have to receive in 
order to gain a certain number of seats (Grofman and King, 2007, 10).  
The third factor is whether it can look at the intent of the map. This test does not 
accomplish that. It will make you ask why a map is a certain way, but in this test there is no built 
in answer to that why. Partisan symmetry just looks at past election results and interrupts those to 
come to a conclusion if there is a bias or not.  
The final factor is whether this test can stand up to review in the court of law. One of the 
main ways is whether or not there is a general consensus that this method is accepted. In the brief 
from Gerken et. al one of the reasons for supporting the use of this method is because it is so 
accepted in the community (Gerken et. al, 2017, 13). The brief cites LULAC v. Perry that had 
justices support along with the district court’s ruling in Gill v. Whitford which also uses this 
method as part of a three prong approach (Gerken et. al, 2017, 13). Moreover, looking at it 
within the parameters of Daubert this test does pass it. There needs to be acceptance in the 
community, which was stated earlier, along with peer reviewed work that has been done. There 
have been many articles that have come out since LULAC v. Perry. This was Gerken et. al’s 
argument in support of the court using the standard of partisan symmetry. In the brief they said 
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that “the [partisan symmetry] standard has now been rigorously vetted and widely applied, and it 
remains the touchstone for measuring fairness in redistricting” (Gerken et. al, 2017, 17).  
Now, this is a generally accepted and peer reviewed standard in the political science 
community. However, another important function of the Daubert test is whether there is a large 
margin of error or the evidence can be easily manipulated. Grofman and King—both experts in 
looking at partisan symmetry—do contend that there can be different approaches to how the 
measure of partisan symmetry is calculated. There are four different methods to calculate and 
three of the methods can “produce very different estimates of partisan bias with a different 
choice of statewide office” (Grofman and King, 2007, 13). This is because the measurement is 
sensitive to the data that is selected to calculate, but they do say that there is a fourth method to 
calculate that now uses all available data that makes it less susceptible to the uncertainty caused 
by the other methods.  
In conclusion, this method does offer a workable standard for the court to use to 
determine if there is bias in how a map is drawn. It does allow the court—or a legislature—see if 
there is a map that disadvantages one party. Through the other statistical measures it can also 
determine if there is malintent in how a district was created rather than the normal political 
consequence of redistricting. Finally, it is seen as being accepted in the field of political science. 
There is some differentiation in how to calculate the measure, but it is still seen as reliable by 
political scientists. 
Efficiency Gap 
 Following Vieth v. Jubelirer, many methods to determine partisan gerrymandering were 
found by the court to not be a suitable alternative. Following the decision in League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry scholars did notice that there seemed to be receptiveness to the 
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idea of partisan symmetry as a means of determining the existence of political gerrymandering 
(Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015, 842). Stephanopoulos and McGhee developed the method 
of the efficiency gap in response to this.  
 The efficiency gap comes from the idea of votes being “efficient” or “inefficient” 
(Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015,  850). They look at a vote as being inefficient if it is in 
favor of a candidate who loses or it is a vote that is in excess of the fifty percent threshold needed 
in a “plurality-rule, single member district (SMD) election” (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015, 
850). The efficiency gap is a percentage that can be compared across elections. The calculations 
for the efficiency gap is simple: “difference between the parties' respective wasted votes, divided 
by the total number of votes cast in the election”  (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015, 851).  
 McGhee is the person who submitted the amicus brief to the court. His brief was in 
support of neither party. There is no advocating for an outcome or a specific standard set forth by 
the Court. Rather, he explained how it functioned and answered potential arguments and 
questions for it. For my explanation and evaluation of the efficiency gap I will look at both the 
submitted brief as well as a journal article that discusses the method.   
 The first standard that the method should meet is that it must determine if there is partisan 
bias in how the districts are drawn. One aspect that makes the efficiency gap more accurate in its 
determination of partisan bias is that it uses “actual election outcomes” (McGhee, 2017, 10). It is 
because of this that the efficiency gap method will stand under the first part of the test. As stated 
in the brief, “the EG quantifies the total or aggregate partisan advantage conferred by a map of 
legislative districts, rather than how much a particular district benefits either party” (McGhee, 
2017, 7). In other words, this method can be used as a way to determine partisan bias.  
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 The second factor is where this test does show its strength. It is important for the court’s 
to be able to contextualize the extent of the bias. One of the advantages to this is that it is 
presented in a percentage form so it can be easily comparable. Stephanopoulos and McGhee do 
discuss in their paper how Justice Stevens in LULAC presented possibilities for how a calculation 
of symmetry could be used. Stevens said that, “the Court could hold that a sufficiently large 
deviation from symmetry…create[s] a prima facie case of an unconstitutional gerrymander’” 
(Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015, 843). In that way this method is effective because it does 
allow a way for the judges be able to see if a map is biased or not.  
The third factor is whether or not it can show intentional bias. The efficiency gap seems 
to be a method that would work in tandem with other evidence or judicial discretion, it would not 
stand on its own. However, the numbers can provide a basis for the court to act upon so they can 
create a threshold for when a state needs to justify their districting methods.  
 The final test for the method is on the quality and reliability of the method in question. 
The first part of this is whether the method is reliable. The efficiency gap is a reliable method. 
The efficiency gap method uses actual election results and a simple method to calculate. So when 
calculating the percentage, “for every 1% increase in a party’s vote share above 50%, that party 
secures an additional 2% of the legislative seats. Thus, an EG of zero means that the election 
results accord with partisan symmetry” (McGhee, 2017, 11). This is an equation that can be used 
in every district thus it can be replicated and used.  
 The method described above has been submitted for peer review. There have been papers 
on this topic in a wide range of journals from the Chicago Law Review to the Election Law 
Journal (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015; Chen, 2017; ). Additionally, the method is 
historically grounded and was developed in response to the Justices’ openness to the idea of 
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partisan symmetry that was expressed in LULAC v. Perry (Stephanopoulos and McGhee, 2015, 
843).  
 The third part is looking at the margin of error. The most important part in regards to this 
is if it could be manipulated easily. The efficiency gap does use a simple equation that is easy to 
understand, so there’s a large margin of error. Additionally, this is a simple metric to look at 
symmetry. This metric does need to be understood in context of the state politics and the 
election, though. Additionally, in the brief McGhee does contend that there are times that 
manipulation could come into play. The first is what version of the efficiency gap the experts 
use. The simplified version of it requires that the number of voters is the same and there are no 
third party candidates, but there is usually a small amount of variation across districts along with 
a lack of third party candidates so the simplified version is “extremely highly correlated” to the 
full version (McGhee, 2017, 13). The other part that is at discretion of the expert is imputations, 
which only comes to play when there is no challenger to a seat.  Therefore the “imputed, two-
party vote for a district represents the expected vote if the seat had been contested” and experts 
can use different approximations for this figure (McGhee, 2017, 14). These two factors can 
contribute to there being a higher margin of error or multiple outcomes for the same map.  
 The final factor is general acceptance. Though there is contention in the discourse 
community about the “best” method of determining gerrymandering, the efficiency gap is seen as 
a viable method for determining gerrymandering. This is another way of deciding if a district is 
symmetrical or not. Additionally,  I want to reiterate that the method of partisan symmetry has 
had acceptance in the legal community as well. Though LULAC v Perry dealt with issues of race 
as well as party affiliations the justices did briefly address partisan symmetry as well. The 





 Political geography has a focus on explaining gerrymandering as opposed to measuring 
the extent of bias. Research done by Chen and Rodden, experts in the field of political 
geography, have looked at “unintentional gerrymandering” that is seen as resulting from 
“Democrats...highly clustered in dense central city areas, while Republicans are scattered more 
evenly through the suburban, exurban, and rural periphery” (Chen and Rodden, 2013, 241). Two 
briefs, however, have been submitted that put forth the idea of political geography being used as 
a measure for gerrymandering. One is from political geography scholars in support of the 
appellee, claiming that the Wisconsin map is biased making it harder for Democrats to get 
elected (Political Geography Scholars, 2017, 4). They argue that political geography does not 
account for this bias and the geography of this state can be used as an explanation for why it is 
biased (Political Geography Scholars, 2017, 18). Best, Donahue, Krasno, Magleby, and 
McDonald also presents a brief that contends that there is empirical evidence using the political 
geography method that the Wisconsin map is biased (2017, 16).  
 An important difference between political geography and other methods is that political 
geography can be used in conjunction with other methods. Typically, using this method will be 
the step after bias is identified. This is because in some states adhering to traditional districting 
standards could generate an unintentional gerrymandering due to the concentration of 
Republicans and Democrats in certain districts (Best et al, 2017, 12). One approach for 
determining if a map is biased due to residential reasons or legislative reasons is generating 
maps. The first brief details the ways this can be done.  First is by comparing the legislative map 
with a number of maps that are randomly generated (Political Geography Scholars, 2017, 13). 
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This can allow a judgement to be made on whether the map was designed to best suit a district 
given limitations or if the lines were drawn with purposeful intentions (Political Geography 
Scholars, 2017, 14). The next way this can be done is generating millions of small changes to the 
current map while still keeping it within the traditional districting criteria (Political Geography 
Scholars, 2017, 14). This is done by changing each district at a time and if it is found that the 
map is considered an outlier then it is suspect of being intentionally gerrymandered (Political 
Geography Scholars, 2017, 15).  
This test works under the first standard.  It is a level of analysis that can be used to see if 
bias is present. The brief from political science scholars explains how this would operate. In the 
brief it describes the analysis saying that, the “greater the share of a party’s voters living in party-
majority “neighborhoods,” the better a party will perform in legislative elections relative to its 
overall vote share” in a scenario such as this natural political geography can explain a map that 
does look to be biased towards one party (Political Geography Scholars, 2017, 17).  So while the 
actual method is not responsible for the determination it does provide contextualization for 
potential bias that is found. Moreover, using the maps you may be able to say that a map is 
biased because there are many more versions of neutral maps that were available.  
The second factor to look at is whether it can determine the strength of the bias. This is a 
strength of using political geography. It allows to see how a specific state or district compared to 
other maps and if the outcome was expected given the map. This does allow us to look at a map 
and see if it affects voters in a certain party by either packing them in one district or splitting 
them across districts.  
The fourth factor details the intent of an authority in creating these maps. Now Political 
Geographers may be able to say that there were all these versions of maps that were better, but if 
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they cannot prove that the districting authority knew about them, the intent part of the case falls 
apart quickly. That is the weakness that is present in this method.  
The fourth factor is the quality of the method. One thing to note is that there are 
differentiations in how political geographers can calculate them. This may alter the conclusion 
that a political geographer may draw. However, in the Political Geography Scholars brief it 
stated, “that three related techniques described [above] permit courts—in a rigorous, objective, 
and replicable manner—to assess whether partisan asymmetry in an electoral map results from 
partisan geography or malicious cartography” (Political Geographers, 2017, 11). This method, 
though, is fairly accurate as it uses modern computers to draw the districting scheme and do the 
comparison, the scientists themselves are not drawing their own conclusions from how the maps 
look.  
The other part of this last factor is whether there is general acceptance in the community. 
There is a wealth of knowledge that has come out recently, especially with advancements in 
computers. Additionally, it is important to note that in the legal community there is acceptance as 
well. Political geography was admitted into evidence at the district court level for Gill v. 
Whitford. The court ruled that “the map was not explained by legitimate state prerogatives and 
neutral factors that are implicated in the districting process” (Political Geographers, 2017, 18). 
So this method is accepted in the community, and political geography is being used as a standard 
to evaluate the maps. 
 
Distribution of Outcomes 
 This method exercises the extreme outlier standard to determine if a map is biased to the 
point where it is unconstitutional. The test that is proposed by Eric Lander in the amicus brief is 
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three pronged in the approach: the first prong is a legal analysis of the state’s goal in 
redistricting, the second prong is the quantitative part, and the third part is the decision by the 
court to see if it constitutes extreme partisanship. The quantitative part is what I will focus on. 
 Essentially, the distribution of outcomes is similar to the method that was done with 
political geographers. The process for this involves first generating maps that matches with the 
state's redistricting goals, then measuring the expected partisan outcome for each plan, showing 
the distribution of these partisan outcomes, and then placing the current plan along the 
distribution. The amicus brief contends that this particular method is the answer to the question 
that the courts have been struggling with. The courts want judicially manageable standards, but 
they have this standard based in legal language and standards, rather than turning to hard data. 
This is a method that provides an exact definition for extreme partisan bias.  
 The first prong of the test is whether or not it can detect bias. Yes, it can detect bias or at 
least say how the map compares with all the other maps. Essentially, it can tell if the plan is more 
or less neutral than other options that the state could have gone with. An important feature is that 
in Lander’s brief he details that the maps generated would match with the states redistricting 
goals.  
 The second factor is whether or not it can show the extent of the bias. This one is good 
for showing the extent of how biased the map was. Comparatively was it 90% more biased than 
possible maps or 10% more biased? From there judges could make the decision about what level 
constitutes a level of bias that is unconstitutional.  
 The third factor is about whether or not this addresses whether the map was created to be 
intentionally biased. Like the Political Geography method this can be difficult in that though 
there could potentially be much better, much more neutral maps that match the states goals, it 
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does not matter unless it can be shown that the state knew about those other plans. If the state, 
for example, said that they used the same software to generate the maps then it would be a 
different discussion.  
 The fourth factor is a discussion on the quality of the method. This method is reliable. It 
can be used in every district and detailed to every district. However, since there are millions of 
possible maps the distribution of outcomes may look slightly different. However, it is important 
to note that because they are creating a multitude of maps, the distribution should be roughly the 
same for each district. The method has been subjected to peer review. However, an important 
note is that the person that proposed this brief is not a political scientist. Eric Lander is a 
biologist and mathematician from MIT, Harvard and founded the Broad Institute. He uses a 
method that is grounded in peer review and a trusted statistical method, Lander has just applied it 
to the realm of political science.  
 General acceptance of this method is more difficult. Distribution of outcomes has been 
used in many fields. However, this method is similar to other methods that are used in both 
political geography and in partisan asymmetry to compute. In that sense this is a method that has 
been used in various social science fields, it is just uncertain in the specific sense of redistricting 
law if it is an accepted standard.  
Legislative Intent 
 Two amicus briefs present the method of invidious intent for determining if a district map 
has been gerrymandered. This is a much different approach from the other quantitative measures 
that were mentioned above. While both briefs state that quantitative measures can be useful they 
miss the step of providing intent. This is because those methods do not account for the fact that 
gerrymandering can exist even with using neutral standards due to the natural distribution of the 
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population in the state (States of Oregon, 2017, 8). To evaluate this under the structure, it does 
become more difficult because it not a test that operates with a purpose to detect bias, but rather 
to interpret bias if present.  
 The first standard is whether or not it can detect bias. The purpose of this method is 
similar to the Political Geography method in that it can be used in conjunction with other tests.  
The first brief focuses on a particular method for an invidious intent: the purpose-and-effects 
test. This is two pronged as the States of Oregon et al. advocate for looking at both the “effect of 
entrenching one political party in power” as well as looking at the intent of the redistricting 
authority in creating the map (States of Oregon et al., 2017, 10). So it does fail the first standard 
of being able to determine if the lines themselves are biased. However, it is important that in 
conjunction with another method it could serve as important context to how a map would operate 
in a single district. This can be important if the entire map is not deemed as being biased, but is 
contained to a few select districts.  
 The second factor is whether it can look at the extent of the bias. This is important 
because it does take a holistic approach. Looking at the first brief, submitted by the States of 
Oregon et al., it proposes that the Supreme court should use a “purpose-and-effects test” (2017, 
2). The importance of invidiousness intent stems from the fact it is a “necessary component of 
the constitutional standard” because the courts have held that a law’s “disproportionate impact, 
standing alone, is insufficient to show a constitutional violation” (States of Oregon et al., 2017, 
10). In the brief, it is explained how invidious intent would be proven. This includes looking at 
what the mapmakers took into consideration when crafting, and also what standards were to be 
followed (States of Oregon et al., 2017, 12). Additionally, the map must also have the purpose of 
creating an “entrenchment” of power for one political party by having a map that would not be 
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responsive to population shifts (States of Oregon et al., 2017, 14). This method is not tackling 
looking at the extent of the bias in the same way but it is showing how it was implemented and 
the effect that that eventually had.  
 The third is looking at whether it can be used to determine intent behind the bias. This is 
where the method has a particular strength. The other brief put forth by the Georgia State 
Conference of the NAACP also advocates for invidious intent. However, this brief advocates for 
this specific method because it has a flexibility that other quantitative measures do not have as 
certain methods “are not relevant in a pinpoint gerrymander of one or a handful of districts” 
(Georgia State Conference, 2017, 5).  Once again, this method is looking at the intent of the map 
makers. Once an effect has been shown, invidious intent will show if that effect was purposeful.  
The fourth consideration is looking at the actual quality of the methods. The method lays 
out a criteria that judges could use in examining a map. . While the objectiveness of legislative 
intent can be a difficult standard as it does require explanation on behalf of the Supreme Court, it 
could easily be tailored for each map. Additionally, it is difficult to open a discussion about 
Daubert standards as it does not use any sort of quantitative evidence. However, this method 
would be the most generally accepted before the Court due to the fact that intent is something 
that is associated with almost all cases that go before courts at all levels.  
It is important to note that this test has great flexibility which can be both its strength and 
its weakness. Additionally, it also does adhere to the historical precedent in Davis v. Bandemer 






Chapter 3: Conclusion 
 After reviewing the history of the Supreme Court redistricting cases in addition to the 
different methods used to determine the neutrality of maps, I argue that there are judicially 
manageable standards that the Supreme Court judges . I do not believe that this question should 
be considered a political question and therefore nonjusticiable. In order to analyze how I argue a 
redistricting case should be heard I will first put forth the proposed test that should be used and 
then advocating for a specific method.  
 The test that I argue should be used is a purpose and effect test. This specific test was 
proposed in the amicus curiae brief by States of Oregon et al. Purpose and effect is a test that 
both looks for a map that not only has the effect of disadvantaging a party or group but also 
looks for intent on the part of the districting authority. Why this is so important is because in 
order to invalidate a map it should be proven that the districting authority is being purposefully 
discriminatory. If there is no purposeful discrimination then there is a chance that the map may 
not be biased, but be a result of the actual makeup of the district. The purpose and effect test can 
allow for a wide range of judicial discretion. There can be standards put in place for the judges to 
determine intent, even using some of the discussed methods above. This also applies to the effect 
prong. Even if the judges decide to use a test, none of the tests results allow for an explanation 
that specifically outlines if a map is discriminatory. Rather, most of them serve to measure the 
effect of discrimination. The judges could then decide at what point a gerrymandering would 
become unconstitutional.  
 When the purpose and effect test is broken down “purpose” is looking at whether or not 
intent is present. It is important to note that invidious intent, the standard proposed in States of 
Oregon et. al, is in some ways already employed by the justices. In LULAC v. Perry, the entire 
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map was not struck down because though partisanship guided certain districts it was not a 
determining factor in the whole map (Citation). Looking further back, even if actions are 
discriminatory judicial discretion and the implementation of a second check will ensure that 
districting authorities will not be too constrained. This has roots in Davis v. Bandemer which 
advocated for a similar purpose and effect test.  
 One other standard that falls under the purpose prong should be how political parties are 
considered. This cases are brought forward as a violation of the equal protection clause. I do 
argue that in addition to the purpose and effect standard that the Supreme Court could also use a 
holistic review standard to help decide this case. The Supreme Court has set the standard of 
using a holistic review in cases that involve race; I believe that this should help shape the 
standards for partisan redistricting. An example is in affirmative action. In Grutter v. Bollinger 
the court ruled that “the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit... narrowly tailored use of race 
in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that 
flow from a diverse student body” (2003, 343). I argue that political party in deciding a map 
should be used in the same way. Like race in admissions, the political makeup of districts should 
not be decided on the sole basis of keeping together or splitting apart a specific group of people. 
However, the process is inherently political. Using parties as a consideration should be allowed 
as long as it is not the only reason that the district lines are created.  
One drawback is that using this holistic review standard would be treating party 
affiliation with strict scrutiny. That is where redistricting policies do differ with affirmative 
action policies. The only time where this would become relevant without any question is if he 
map districting policies were designed to target racial groups of people. When discussing levels 
of scrutiny many would argue that the most appropriate would be a rational basis test which a 
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law (or in this case redistricting plan) would fail if the government has no legitimate interest in 
the plan and the policy has no rational link between the plan and the legitimate objective. 
However, I am not arguing that the Supreme Court should treat political affiliation as a suspect 
class, but rather in the proposed purpose and effect test, under the purpose prong they should 
look at the government’s intent. If the government is considering political party without looking 
at other characteristics of the demographics or the geographic location then it should raise a red 
flag that the plan is potentially unconstitutional if it is coupled with a negative effect.  
Finding if a plan has a negative effect is much more difficult than even looking at intent. I 
do not advocate for one over the other to be used, but I do believe that the judges need to utilize 
the wealth of resources. Redistricting has become much more complex over the years with all the 
new technology put in place, and the fact of the matter is that many redistricting authorities has 
access to technology to create complex gerrymanders (States of Oregon et. al, 2017, 5; Altman, 
MacDonald, and McDonald, 2005). In order for justices to be able to detect an unconstitutional 
gerrymander they would need to evaluate a map using these methods. In the specific case of Gill 
v. Whitford, I argue is the Justices should select a combination methods that were submitted in 
the amicus curiae brief and state how that standard is the most appropriate for this situation. For 
example, in the case of Wisconsin it deals with the constitutionality of a whole map. The test 
used for a whole map may be much different than a test that is used for a single district.  
I propose that the Supreme Court should use a combination of methods in order to 
determine if a map is an unconstitutional gerrymandering. Many of the methods that were 
reviewed above work the best in culmination with other methods. I argue that the Supreme 
Court, for the effect prong, should use one standard that is in equation such as the Efficiency Gap 
or Partisan Asymmetry. If that result leads the justices to a conclusion of an unconstitutional 
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partisan gerrymander then they should consult Political Geography to see if whether or not the 
goal was truly intentional.  
These combined methods will allow for a holistic review that is preferable to other 
methods. Now, one important reason that I advocate first for a purpose and effect prong, and 
second for a method that uses different methods is simple. First, intent is key. In order for a plan 
to most successfully be invalidated there needs to be proven intent and effect. A plan can be 
proven to have a bad effect and still be struck down, but an intent prong sets a precedence that 
gerrymandering is a problem that needs to be addressed. Moreover, the argument for the methods 
of partisan symmetry or the efficiency gap is due to the fact that both use actual election results 
to judge the level of partisan bias without any hypothetical action. Though political geography 
can be helpful in evaluating a district through its specific measures of partisan concentration, the 
trouble that it runs into is that it generates dozens of maps to compare the original against. 
However, even if the creation of the map adheres to the standards that the redistricting authority 
used, there can be little to know proof that the possible maps generated were known to the 
redistricting authority. Perhaps, it may be impractical to use all two methods for one prong, but it 
can be an important check to use two different methods.  
Gerrymandering is a problem in the United States. That is not the argument that my thesis 
sought to make. Rather, the problem is that there are a lack of judicially manageable standards to 
judge if a map has been altered to the point where it crosses the threshold into unconstitutional.  I 
argue that there are viable standards for the Supreme Court to use, not only in Gill v. Whitford, 
but in all cases moving forward. The amicus curiae briefs provide ample evidence that there are 
ways to measure bias and provide frameworks in order to judge the maps. I do not advocate for a 
specific outcome in this case, only that standards exist and should be applied. Questions about 
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elections and democracy have gone unanswered far too long, especially when there are standards 
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